1925

Freudianism and Art

Freud had a significant following in Russia in the 1920s. Many of his major writings appeared in Russian translation.[1] Psychoanalytic societies existed in Moscow, Petersburg and other cities. Freud himself considered Moscow the third most important city for psychoanalysis after Vienna and Berlin. As in other countries, psychoanalysis in Russia spread into the area of literary criticism, where Professor Ivan Ermakov wrote his famous studies on Gogol and Pushkin.[2]

Grigoriev's 1925 article, "Psychoanalysis as a Method of Investigating Imaginative Literature," raised many questions which Voronsky had been pondering. For a while, his interest in the role of the unconscious in literary creativity had directed him toward Freud's theories about the dynamic unconscious. In 1923 he had encouraged the publication of a series of psychoanalytic

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1. Psikhopatologiia obydennoi zhizni, Moscow, 1910; "Naviazchivye deistviia i religioznye obriady," Psikhoterapio, 1911, no. 4/5; Psikhoanaliticheskie etiudy, Moscow, 1912; O psikhoanalize, Izd. "Nauka," Moscow, 1912; Leonardo da Vinchi. Vospominaniia detstva, "Sovremennye problemy," Moscow, Pg., 1912; Tolkovanie snovidenii, Moscow, 1913. Lektsii po vvedeniiu v psikhoanaliz, 2 toma, Moscow, Pg., 1923; "Nekotorye tipy kharakterov iz psikhologicheskoi praktiki," in: Psikhologicheskaia i psikhoanaliticheskaia biblioteka, vyp. 5, M.-P., 1923; Osnovnye psikhologicheskie teorii v psikhoanalize, Gos. Izd., Moscow; Pg.; 1923; Totem i tabu: Psikhologiia pervobytnoi kul'tury i religii, Moscow, Pg., 1923; Totem i tabu, Moscow, Pg., 1924; Ocherki po teorii seksual'nosti, Moscow, Pg., 1924; Ia i odno, Leningrad, 1924; Moscow, 1924; Psikhologiia mass i analiz chelovecheskogo "Ia", Moscow, 1925; Po tu storonu printsipa udovol'stviia, Moscow, 1925; Psikhologicheskie etiudy, Odessa, 1926.
2. I. D. Ermakov, Etiudy po psikhologii tvorchestva A. S. Pushkina (Gosizdat, 1923); Ocherki po analizu tvorchestva N. V. Gogolia (Gosizdat, 1924).

works by Gosizdat. Yet as a Marxist, Voronsky had significant misgivings about some aspects of Freud's teachings. Were the philosophical underpinnings truly materialist? Was the social aspect slighted by the biological or purely sexual? Voronsky therefore advocated a cautious approach to Freud, urging a serious study of his main works. He was certainly not in favor of suppressing Freudianism or banishing the psychoanalyst's works, barbaric steps that were taken as the editor of Red Virgin Soil was pushed from the literary scene at the end of the 1920s.

It is interesting to compare Voronsky's ideas about Freud with Trotsky's statements both in Literature and Revolution and "Culture and Socialism" (see p. 468). Trotsky had lived in Vienna from 1907 to 1914 and was introduced to Freudian circles by Adolf Joffe and Alfred Adler. There is no doubt that his attitude toward Freudian precepts strongly influenced Voronsky's views. Another major source is Franz Wittels's 1924 biography of Freud which was published in a Russian translation in 1925.[3]

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I. The Theory of Dream-Symbols

In the recent period our scholars and journalists have been paying more and more attention to Freud's theory of psychoanalysis. Proof of this attention is shown by the series of works by Freud and his followers which have been newly translated into Russian, by the original articles and compilations which have been placed in journals, and by attempts to unite Freudianism with Marxism. Special significance for all who are interested in the field of art is contained in the question: "To what extent can the teachings of Freud be utilized and taken into consideration by Marxist literary criticism?" That is why one must welcome the article by I. Grigoriev, "Psychoanalysis as a Method of Investigating Imaginative Literature."[4]

In our opinion, I. Grigoriev has been absolutely correct in noting the errors committed and the extremes allowed by Freudians when they analyze works of art. It is also true that particularly arbitrary judgments and strained

3. F. Vittel, Freid: Ego lichnost', uchenie i shkola (Leningrad: 1925).
4. Cf. Krasnaia nov', no. 7 (1925): pp. 224–241.

interpretations have been demonstrated by our own followers of Freud, by sometimes taking his method in literary criticism to a point of obvious absurdity. It is unfortunate, however, that Grigoriev himself proposes an application of psychoanalysis in art which raises very legitimate doubts about its expediency. By trying to unite Freudianism and Marxism, Grigoriev has committed a number of extremely crude errors which are both very revealing and by no means accidental for Freudianism.

I. Grigoriev thinks that only certain aspects of psychoanalysis may be gainfully used in literary criticism. What the author considers to be the most fruitful hypothesis is Freud's doctrine of the dynamic unconscious. In contrast to psychologists of the old schools, Freud asserts that our unconscious leads its own special and active life, and breaks through into the sphere of our consciousness in a distorted form. The facts of our consciousness are supposedly symbols, or special signs, of an enormous unconscious complex of feelings and desires, which are of a fundamentally sexual character. By employing the complicated psychoanalytical method, we can explain and reveal the genuine content which is concealed behind these symbolic signs. The analyst of artistic works also confronts the peculiar tasks associated with such deciphering. While rejecting Freud's sexual theory, I. Grigoriev finds that the doctrine of the dynamic unconscious strikes a blow against the naively realistic conception of art. The artist doesn't try to impassively cognize and portray reality. Reality, of course, is reflected by the artist in his work, but the "center of gravity" is not in this reflection, but in the behavior and the intentions of the artist. And the intentions of the artist, which are to a large measure unconscious, force their way through in special hieroglyphs—or images. "Just as a displaced intention breaks through into dream symbols, so too the intention of the artist is transposed, but more artificially, in the signs of the artistic work." Hence: "reality, insofar as it is reflected in the plot [siuzhet], images, and so forth, is only a device for revealing the intentions of the artist." One must be able to explain the actual content of these dreams, to decipher their dark and hidden meaning. This is the task of psychoanalysis in art.

What has been said agrees fully with and derives from Freud's doctrine. I. Grigoriev simply has stressed certain points which usually remain somewhat obscured with the Freudians. According to Freud, the peculiarity of the artist consists in the fact that the unconscious feelings of early childhood, which bear

a sexual character, are later reworked into image-symbols. The artist conquers forbidden feelings, translating them into the special language of his fantasy and imagination. By experiencing them ideally, by concealing them in the images which are the products of his creation, he saves both himself and others from having to relive and experience them in real life. For Freud, reality in works of art is indeed only a device or symbol. The theory of dream-symbols logically flows from Freud's entire system. We highly recommend that anyone who has doubts about this should carefully investigate the core of Freud's doctrine about the "ego" and the "id." "Ego" is consciousness, "id" is the unconscious element. "Ego" is consciousness which sees, "id" is unconscious and blind. "Ego-consciousness" restrains "id," but how? "Ego-consciousness" is only the agent of "id," fulfilling the will of its master. Consciousness is the slave of the unconscious, consciousness warns the unconscious of danger, holds it in check, but is wholly dependent on it. Consciousness embodies the intentions of the unconscious. Thus, in Freud's doctrine of "ego" and "id," only the dependence of consciousness on the "id-unconscious" is established. Freud mentions the outer world as well, but nowhere is the dependence of consciousness on this realm ever examined or analyzed. And isn't the "id-unconscious" also the outer world? Freud evades this question, but it is very significant that the unconscious is called "id." Such is the name of the object. Once consciousness is linked only to the "id," to the unconscious, and is not connected with the environment, the theory of dream-symbols, where the facts of consciousness symbolize only the intentions of the unconscious element, inevitably suggests itself. Returning to Grigoriev, let us note first of all that his conception that realistic art impassively reflects reality is an oversimplification. Neither Belinsky, nor Chernyshevsky, nor Plekhanov ever explained realism in art as the passive reflection of life. They always kept firmly in mind that the artist, while thinking in images, nevertheless feels, suffers or rejoices. Realistic artists—Tolstoy, Balzac, Flaubert and even Zola—have never been engaged in the impassive copying of reality. The fact that, while receiving impressions from the external world, a person makes a selection and takes in far from everything, has also long been known and firmly established by experimental psychology prior to Freud, and one by no means has to be a follower of Freud to assert that the world of reality is reworked in the perceptions of the subject. If, nevertheless, defenders of the realistic conception of art have spoken and continue to speak today about the depiction and reflection of reality in works

of art, and about the objectivity and exactitude of this reflection, then there have been and continue to be very good reasons for this approach.

Starting from the presence of the dynamic unconscious in man's psyche, which is established by Freud's psychoanalysis, I. Grigoriev proposes to look upon works of art as dream-symbols of a special type, behind which are hidden the intentions of the artist. It is unclear why one must limit oneself in this instance only to the realm of art. It is patently clear that by accepting such a hypothesis we are obliged to explain scientific disciplines, too, as dream-symbols of a special kind. Despite art's great subjectivity and "intimacy," art and science have one and the same object, one and the same reality: nature, human society, people's thoughts and feelings. Materialist art critics have always affirmed this. They have felt that art is distinguished from science not by its object, but by the means of treating this object; the peculiarity of art they saw in the imaginative and concrete apprehension and transmission of the world, and not in the fact that the world of art is qualitatively different from the world of science. The object is one and the same.

If the facts of artistic perception with regard to the object are similar to dream-symbols, then the facts of scientific perception are also such dream-symbols. In dreams we not only see, but make judgments, argue and analyze. Whoever argues that reality for the artist is only a device must also say the same thing for the scientist. But then we must also go even further and say: we don't know whether the external world exists or whether it is only our own representation. If it is only a device or symbol, then it at best gives our sensations and notions some sort of jolt, it gives rise to our sensations and thoughts, which do not, however, stand in any truly cognizable relationship to the reality existing outside of us. A light knock or rustling is perceived during one's dreams and reworked into a majestic picture of a thunderstorm with pouring rain, soaring heavens, thick clouds, and so forth. But the stimulus to dream-symbols may be internal, organic irritation, or vague wishes and feelings. The symbol, by its very nature is devoid of an internal similarity to the object which it symbolizes. The symbol is a conditional, accidental sign. The ancient symbol of redemptive suffering—the cross—has no organic connection with the suffering itself.

What results have we obtained?

The view of art and science as a world of special symbols which transpose the moods of the artist and scientist leads with inexorable logic either

to agnosticism or to subjective idealism. In the beginning of his article I. Grigoriev notes that Freud's theory, taken in its logically finished form, "calls to mind the grand metaphysical systems of Plato, Schopenhauer, and others." To this we must add: "the grand metaphysical systems" are called to mind by the attempts of Grigoriev to replace the realistic conception of art with the theory of dream-symbols. While protesting against "passive" realism, I. Grigoriev has advanced completely idealist arguments which agree fully with Freud.

The author was guided by obviously noble intentions to reconcile Freudianism with Marxism in aesthetics. But the cardinal question in Marxism is the question of the relationship of thinking to being, of the subject to the object. Not only in philosophy, not only in science, but in art as well, it is impossible to take a single step forward without having clarified this question. Grigoriev gave his answer not according to Marx, but according to Freud. People who adopt Marx's materialist point of view propose that our sensations and ideas [predstavleniia] have not only subjective significance, but objective significance, too, and that they reflect reality, both in science and in art, not as hieroglyphs and symbols, but as images of the world. By this we by no means wish to say that these reflections are an exact and unconditional copy of reality, or that our images of the world truly and absolutely reproduce this world. The object is never equal to the subject. First of all, the world surrounding us is infinitely richer and more variegated than its reflection in our psyche. Even now we know relatively little about it. But these reflections are not symbols, i.e., conditional, arbitrary signs, behind which are hidden only our intentions. The reflections are relatively exact, true and objective. Whoever adheres to this view will search in works of art for exactness, truth and correspondence to reality, without, of course, omitting intentions for a single moment either.

By the way, let us say that the definition of art which is given by some of the On-Guardists—art is a means of emotional infection—very easily coexists with idealist and agnostic theories. Such a definition is insufficient, for it ignores and fails to answer the fundamental question of the relationship between thinking and being.

It could be said that artistic truths, as opposed to scientific truths, are exclusively subjective. Such a view is held, for instance by Le Dantec in his interesting book Cognition and Consciousness.[5] He asserts this on the basis that works of art are still interpreted in every which way, that hundreds of opinions exist about the same thing, and that there are just about as many artistic

truths as there are artists. "Outside of science, the word 'truth' has no meaning whatsoever." This statement is incorrect. There is no agreement among scientists either. General recognition of scientific truths is not only almost always questioned by scientists belonging to various tendencies and schools, but is not convincing to millions of people. Art is more subjective, science is more impersonal—this is true, but here the difference is relative. Subjectivism in science is sometimes stronger than in art, especially wherever class interests are openly touched upon. There are more arguments about Marx's theory of surplus value than about Tolstoy's The Caucasian Prisoner or Kholstomer. Darwin's theory even now meets a host of the most vehement opponents. The novels of Balzac, Flaubert and Tolstoy, and the works of Gogol and Chekhov give indisputable, albeit incomplete, artistic truths. In short, the concept of truth has significance not only in science but also in art. In both areas, intentions relentlessly emerge and give notice of themselves. If the word "truth" had no significance in art, then we would have to say that the artist, as opposed to the scientist, moves exclusively in a subjective world, and that he is a solipsist. Then he would create things which are comprehensible to himself alone. But such is not the case: the scientist generalizes the social experience of people in concepts, the artist generalizes social experience as well, but in images. Art is a social phenomenon; whoever states that the truths of art are exclusively subjective by the same token denies the social origins of art and the social significance of artistic works. He looks upon a work as the product of narrow, individualistic creativity, and upon the artist as a being without social bonds. Such a view is alien to Marxism, but as we will see below, it lies at the foundation of the methodology of Freudian aestheticians. Subjectivism in resolving the problem of the relationship between thinking and being is firmly bound up with their subjective method in interpreting works of art.

II. Intention and Reality

The facts of our consciousness, state the Freudians, are similar to dream-symbols. Behind them lurk intentions. Reality is only a device. The incompatibility of this blatantly idealist theory with Marxism we have already tried to demonstrate.

5. Félix Le Dantec, Science et conscience (Paris: 1901).

How do things stand, however, with intentions and their relationship to reality? Let us allow that our thoughts and images are dream-symbols in relation to our intentions; does it flow from this that reality is a device? Let us take a more obvious and simpler example of an application of Freud's psychoanalysis. In his Outlines of Psychology, L. Jameson, who is also trying to unite Freudianism with Marxism, tells of the following case as reported by Bernhardt Hart. The teacher of a certain Sunday school is transformed from a religious person into a passionate atheist.

> He insisted that he arrived at this point of view as a result of a prolonged and conscientious study of the subject, and indeed, he attained truly broad knowledge in the realm of Christian apologetics.... Nevertheless, the psychoanalysis which subsequently took place discovered the real complex which had caused his atheism: a girl, whom he was courting, married one of the most enthusiastic, in religious matters, of his fellow teachers at the Sunday school. The causal complex—malice towards his lucky competitor—manifested itself in his renunciation of those beliefs which had previously been the source of such closeness between comrades. Arguments, study and citations were only the result of rationalization.[6]

Here is a typical and extremely simple example of the application of psychoanalysis. It establishes the primacy of intention, and the servile, subordinate role of cognitive judgments. The intention—a feeling of malice—broke into the sphere of consciousness not directly, but tangentially, in symbols. The arguments, citations and study are symbols. Behind all this are we justified in questioning the cognitive value of these ciphers and symbols, or shall we say, like the Freudians and Comrade Grigoriev, that it is of course possible to raise the question, too, about the reflection of reality, or, in the given example, about the logical persuasiveness of the arguments and quotations, but that this question is not the main thing?

The problem of the cognitive value of the contents of our consciousness would arise neither in science nor in art only if we were to acknowledge that, besides our intentions and our behavior, nothing exists in the world, and that our sensations, ideas and thoughts serve only as an expression of some of

6. L. Jameson, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 4–5.

these intentions. For Freud and his followers who have arrived at the grand metaphysical systems of Plato and Schopenhauer, such is the case. We Marxists, however, adopt a different position. We propose, as we have shown, that besides our intentions there exists the world which is independent of us, and that it was given long before the appearance of our intentions. And since the world, which is independent of us, exists in addition to our sensations, then it is clear that we have good reason to be interested in not only what relation our thinking and our images have to intentions, but to this reality as well. Let us allow that in the example with the teacher, psychoanalysis correctly discovered the real motives of the teacher; however that does not erase the question about the logical strength of the teacher's arguments and quotations in favor of atheism. And if the teacher had artistic talent and tried to show his atheistic views in images, then we would have just as good reason to be curious about whether the system of atheistic philosophy had been truly and convincingly reflected in images, i.e., we would be interested in the question of the reflection of reality in his work. The real issue is that the teacher has not one but two intentions: one is hidden, his malice toward his opponent; and the other is open, and connected with the first effort to cause harm to his opponent by means of the force of logical argumentation in favor of atheism.

People will say: in the example of the teacher, the arguments and quotations are undoubtedly the same symbolical signs about which the Freudians and Comrade Grigoriev are both speaking. This is absolutely correct. They are symbols in relation to intention and behavior, but they by no means serve as symbols in relation to reality. Like the Freudians, Grigoriev has confused these two relationships. He started with the assumption that the behavior of the artist is transposed in artistic images, and concluded from this that reality in an artistic work is in general only a device, symbol or hieroglyph, and that to be concerned with the question of its reflection in the work is neither interesting nor necessary. This conclusion is absolutely unwarranted, unjustified and un-Marxist. We should note that in drawing such a conclusion I. Grigoriev is merely echoing the Freudian school. In their analysis of artistic works, Freudians usually limit themselves to explaining how the unconscious impulses of the artist are hidden in symbol-images. They neither investigate nor resolve the problem of the reflection of reality. From their point of view this is completely consistent. Whoever adheres to an idealist system of views may limit himself to an explanation of the reflection in our consciousness of intentions

alone, for only intentions really exist, and the world is their symbol; the object, independent of us, either does not exist, or we know nothing about it.

Starting from Freud's idealist construction, I. Grigoriev, once again and in full agreement with Freud's school, incorrectly and mistakenly resolves the problem of the relationship of man's behavior and impulses to the process of cognition. Perhaps even the most "passive" realist will decide to assert that hidden and open sensuous stimuli have enormous significance in the work of an artist and scientist. The artist thinks and feels with images, because he "intends." Desire is the father of all cognition, including that of the artist. Tormented by desires, man sets himself goals and acts in the corresponding manner. Desires and intentions thus enter into the practice of social man as a component part; the significance of practice in the cognitive process has been evaluated by Marxism in a worthy manner. The success of our actions, wrote Engels, shows the agreement of our perceptions with the objective nature of perceived things. Marx's second thesis on Feuerbach states:

> The question of whether human thinking has objective truth is by no means a question of theory, but a practical question. In practice man must show the truthfulness, i.e., the reality and power, the all-sidedness of his thinking. The argument about the reality or unreality of thinking isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.[7]

Desires and motives, which comprise a component part of practice, verify the truth, power and objectivity of our thinking. The problem of the reality of thinking is not only not removed by the practical activity of man, but, on the contrary, this activity is the sole, universal criterion of the value of all cognition, whether scientific or artistic. With the Freudians everything is "topsy-turvy": since our sensations, thoughts, ideas and images are conditioned by the behavior of man, then reality is only a conditional sign, a device; what is important are intentions and behavior, but not the reflection of reality in consciousness. The behavior of man determines the system of his views, this is the alpha and omega of Marxism. The whole question, however, lies in what is the nature of this behavior, does it help man in cognizing the world or does it hinder such an undertaking? In order to answer this question, we must know

7. For another English translation, see: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 5 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 3. Trans.

what precisely are the motives, what are the practice and behavior of man in society. Let us suppose that a certain artist harbors an extreme hatred for the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Republic. Without shying away from any reactionary forces, he struggles against the hated "Sovdepia."[8] Devoting himself to such a practice with faith and justice, and under its immediate influence, in his novels, novellas, stories and articles he portrays the Russian Revolution and its active participants, let us say, in the same manner that is done abroad by the Shmelevs, Chirikovs, Gippiuses, and so forth. The influence of the behavior of the artist on his creativity is obvious. Let us further assume, to please the Freudians, that in an analysis of this behavior we followed further along the road of the Freudian school and, as a result, we discovered at the heart of the reactionary pretensions and demands the existence of hidden, atavistic inclinations—sadism, perverted sexuality, and so on. All this was projected into corresponding images, types and pictures. After asking the question, to what degree is the Russian Revolution faithfully reflected by the artist in these images and descriptions, we arrive at the conclusion that reality is completely distorted. The intentions and behavior of the artist have not coincided with the objective course of development of social life, and therefore he has given us a distorted reality. On the other hand, the intentions and behavior of an artist standing for the proletarian revolution have helped him reflect the revolutionary reality more or less correctly and to the extent that his talents and judgments allow, for they have coincided with the objective course of history. The task of the critic in each case amounts to explaining the intentions of the artist, but this is only one side of the matter. Another, no less important, task consists in revealing the extent to which these intentions have helped or hindered the reproduction of reality. The most extreme scholasticism is to decide which is more important in the analysis of a work—the discovery of the hidden or open motives of the artist, or the explanation of how faithfully and in what manner life is reflected in the work. Both are equally important, and both are mutually connected; behavior determines the degree of authenticity of the reflection, while in the reflections, behavior is revealed. Behavior explains the specific social gravity of the artist and his work, revealing their class nature, while the question of the reflection of reality in the work is posed because both thinking and being exist, both subject and object, and because the resolution

8. Pejorative term for Soviet Russia, Soviet Union. Derived from Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies. Trans.

of the antinomy between being and thinking is essentially important not only in philosophy and in separate scientific disciplines, but in art as well.

Freud's doctrine about the relationship between "ego" and "id" establishes only the dependence of "ego-consciousness" on the elemental realm of the unconscious, while the dependence of consciousness on the external world is completely ignored. Now we can say with confidence why it is ignored. Here the heart of the matter by no means lies with the methodological aims of the psychologist, but in the very essence of Freud's doctrine. The proposition that consciousness depends not only on the unconscious, but first and foremost on being, on the external world, fundamentally undermines the foundations of Freud's theory. Once thinking is determined by being, then it is impossible to reduce the work of consciousness to the exclusive execution of the directives issuing from the unconscious elemental realm, even if these directives are subject to the censorship of consciousness. Obviously, the function of consciousness is much wider in scope. Consciousness is given to us not only in order to "symbolize" our unconscious intentions, but in order that we might be able to cognize objective reality. The "symbolism" of intentions is a by-product here. Whoever thinks according to Freud inevitably becomes tangled in the thought that truth is only an expression of our intentions, i.e., in subjectivism.

Subjectivism in resolving the problem of the relationship between the intentions and behavior of the artist to artistic truth sometimes filters through even into the type of milieu where it would seem that it is simply out of place. Hence our Proletcultists, mainly those who are trying to unite proletarian culture with futurism, never tire of counterposing practice, behavior and "directedness" to "passéism," while actually meaning by "passéism" the ability of our scientific or artistic consciousness to truly comprehend and reflect being.

Many of the On-Guardist comrades also go off the tracks over intentions. With them, class intentions almost always push into the background the cardinal question even in art about the relationship of thinking to being; once the class content is evident, there can be no talk about the objectivity of the content of our consciousness. In addition, they understand objectivity to be the indifference and disinterestedness of the scientist and artist, and not the correspondence of their subjective perceptions to the object. Therefore they inevitably fly into a rage as soon as there is talk about how exactly and truthfully this or that reality is reflected in a work of art, for they consider such interpretations and judgments an encroachment upon the dictatorship of the

proletariat. Meanwhile, this does not prevent them in practice from screaming about the criminal distortions of revolutionary reality allowed by the invidious fellow-travelers.

III. The Unconscious

In one respect I. Grigoriev is evidently correct: Freud's doctrine of the dynamic unconscious is in some ways, but not all, one of the fruitful hypotheses in the realm of individual psychology. Freud annihilates the superficial, rationalistic conception of the human psyche, which had already been fundamentally undermined, however, before him. There is no doubt that beyond the threshold of our consciousness lies an enormous sphere of the subconscious, and that this subconscious in no way resembles a warehouse or closet where, for the time being, our desires, feelings and intentions reside in a state of inactive rest or sleep. Relegated for various reasons to the remote regions of our consciousness, they lead a very active life and, once they achieve certain strength, they unexpectedly burst forth into our conscious "ego," sometimes in a twisted, distorted or deceptive guise. It would be naive to assume that our consciousness always and in all things governs itself and subordinates to itself our desires and thoughts. Almost always it is a steward, executing the will of its lord.

In aesthetics, therefore, Freud's doctrine asserts that the creative act of the artist cannot be reduced to rationalistic devices, technique, construction or energetic word-formation by themselves. Here intuition and instinct play a decisive role. The dynamic unconscious, introduced by Freud's psychoanalysis, reveals more precisely the content of the concept of intuition. Intuition is our active unconscious. Intuitive truths are authentic and indisputable; they require no logical verification and frequently cannot be verified by logical means precisely because they undergo preliminary development in the subconscious realm of our life and then reveal themselves immediately, suddenly and unexpectedly in our consciousness, as if they were independent of our "ego," and not subject to its preliminary work. Hence they are perceived to be superficial and accidental. The appearance of intuitive truths seems mysterious to us, they "dawn" upon us, they visit us like unexpected and unforeseen guests. Psychoanalysis explains this "mysteriousness." As a matter of fact, the unconscious has never been denied by Marxists in psychology, or even more so in art.

The unconscious, instinctive and intuitive intentions of the artist have always been taken into account by Marxist art critics. To a certain degree, Freud's psychoanalysis reveals the mechanics of the individual subconscious and how it breaks through into the open. But even in this sphere, as we will see further on, it is necessary to make a number of very important qualifications.

The dynamic unconscious undoubtedly stresses the significance of sensuous and other impulses in artistic and scientific activity. The view that an artist or scientist arrives at a given complex of images or scientific concepts only because he is convinced of their logical or aesthetic value is severely restricted by Freud's psychoanalysis. The artist or scientist is "convinced" primarily because he wishes to convince himself. Desires and wishes force him to select the conclusions or choose the images which correspond the most with these desires. It only seems to the artist or scientist that he dispassionately and "from eternal considerations" is guided by purely scientific or purely artistic tasks. Such rationalization is most often made unconsciously, since the intentions of the artist or scientist are unconscious and hidden. Hence the task of the critic is to uncover this illusory rationalism, to expose the hidden intentions. In fact, there is nothing new here for Marxism. In art, Marxism has long since used this method. It may be that Freud's psychoanalysis is instructive in the sense that it shows how many difficulties accompany this work of "removing the veils" from the thoughts of the scientist or artist, which are sometimes so carefully concealed. Very complicated, and sometimes indirect paths must be used here; very refined and painstaking work is required. Freudianism turns our attention to and forces us to evaluate details when direct analysis stumbles into a number of obstacles. In such cases, significant assistance can be rendered by a single scene, picture, phrase, image or slip of the tongue. Often these trivial details are more characteristic than the skeleton of the work itself. Our people almost always arm themselves with club and ax where a lancet is actually needed. They display a fair amount of courage, but Marx's method suffers obvious injury from this audacity. The ideological arsenal which supplies the "weapon of criticism" is rather modest: "philistinism," "petty-bourgeois," "petty tradesman"—and it's in the bag. And to top it all off, these concepts are used more often not in an analytical sense, but as terms of abuse and vituperation. And usually the most important thing lies beyond the bounds of criticism: the individual visage of the writer. "Audacity" without sufficient foundation leads to suspiciously categorical judgments. Everything

is clear, everything is resolved, all has been exhaustively proven. There is not even a hint of the caution, and even irresolution, which can be felt, for instance, with Marx himself in his famous discussion about the works of Greek art. A categorical approach, in its turn, leads to the rapid banishment of "heretics." Everyone knows that our people now excommunicate both artists and critics, decisively, rigorously, and by the hour. Meanwhile, the unsleeping eye of the On-Guardists might spot a polemical "deviation" on our part.

The theory of the dynamic unconscious teaches, moreover, to regard with very great circumspection any rationalistic interpretations of the motives and deeds of the heroes and characters of the work being analyzed. Critics, including even Marxists, sometimes demand that the artist grounds the actions and deeds of his heroes clearly, distinctly and rationally. When they fail to find such a rational foundation, they begin to declare that the artist has arbitrarily forced his hero to act. But the conduct of the hero and his utterances, like those of any person, are almost always rooted in the unconscious; they are often irrational in the sense that they do not yield to and cannot be explained by conscious motives. This of course does not mean that the artist is justified in attributing to his hero whatever behavior he may like. It means only one thing: the conduct of a given hero may not be sensible from the usual, normal, narrowly rational point of view, but it must flow organically from his whole nature. If this conduct appears unmotivated, sudden and accidental as far as the conscious content of the hero is concerned, then it must be motivated by the entire complex of his hidden and open feelings and intentions. Since the investigation of the dynamics and mechanics of the unconscious sometimes presents insuperable difficulties, then what is demanded from the critic as well as the reader in such cases is that which is called sensitivity. Only sensitivity is almost always capable of unraveling and evaluating the extent to which the various deeds of a hero are internally motivated and consistent with his nature. Particular difficulties arise in analyzing the works of an author with whom the irrational element in his heroes participates most actively. Such is the case, for instance, with Dostoevsky and Shakespeare. This means that to transmit to another person an aesthetic evaluation based on feeling, or to analytically assess it, is sometimes a matter which is far from easy. Such communication is possible only under harmonious conditions.

Such, perhaps, are the boundaries of what is positively contained in Freud's doctrine of the unconscious for Marxist literary criticism. The majority of

what is valuable in this doctrine has essentially been long ago considered by Marxism. But this positive content by no means equals what are known to be the negative elements in this doctrine which are unacceptable to Marxism.

Marxism has never denied the dynamics of the unconscious, but, using this concept broadly, has included within it a different content than found with Freud. We also propose, in agreement with Grigoriev, that the task of psychiatrists and psychopathologists is to determine the degree to which they can use in their special investigations the Freudian doctrine that all our impulses are reduced to sexual attraction. It is possible that in psychoanalyzing phenomena of a pathological character, Freud's proposition is capable of yielding valuable results. In the field of psychopathology, Freud gathered rich and interesting material, assiduously studied it, and only the most far-reaching empirical verification can establish to what degree and on what scale this proposition of Freud's will be used in psychopathology. It is hardly possible to doubt, however, that in the normal life and activity of people, besides sexual attraction, there are other no less powerful stimuli: hunger, social impulses, and so forth. It is all the more necessary to say this with regard to the so-called Oedipus complex,[9] to which Freudians usually try to reduce the basic content of artistic productions. Marxist aestheticians have established that at the dawn of human culture, art was directly dependent on how man labored and how he provided himself with food. Meanwhile, according to Freud, we must search for the original sources of art in the overcoming of the Oedipus complex, which in an albeit sublimated form remains the main theme of artistic works to this day. This absolutely arbitrary assumption, and the obvious absurdities which color the investigations of Freudians in art, only confirm the one-sidedness of their theory. Marxists have never reduced the unconscious to sexual attractions alone, and the doctrine of the Oedipus complex, which has clearly psychopathological characteristics, is even more alien to them. According to Freud, the unconscious contains within it the lower, atavistic inclinations of man. "Forbidden" by the course of mankind's cultural life, and displaced into the depths of our being, they let themselves be known by bursting forth under favorable circumstances into our consciousness in a sublimated, distorted form. Marxist sociology considers this assertion as well to be one-sided and therefore untrue. Our subconscious inclinations have a more variegated and richer character. What is translated into the subconscious sphere are those feelings and desires which are formed, accumulated and perfected in the

process of our social development. Such, for instance, are social instincts. To the extent that they take on the characteristics of habits, or that they become mechanical, they are translated from the sphere of consciousness to the sphere of the subconscious. Self-sacrifice, bravery, solidarity, a taste for society, and so forth, almost always have the same subconscious character as the hidden, sexual and atavistic motives advanced by the Freudians. Obviously, not only does the subconscious wage war with consciousness, but in the subconscious itself a relentless war is waged between various tendencies. The course and outcome of this struggle is determined by the surrounding milieu; later and more progressive subconscious inclinations under unfavorable circumstances may be overwhelmed, and they will give way to atavistic motives. Thus, the bloody war which began in 1914 undoubtedly awakened sadism, destructive instincts, and so forth. Mankind goes "upward and onwards" not along direct, but complicated and indirect pathways, now stumbling, now retreating, now making broad detours. In the epoch when it is flourishing, a ruling class develops within itself the most positive instincts; when it is on the decline, in the interests of self-defense it is forced to address and cultivate within itself feelings which, it would seem, have been condemned by history.

The process of the rationalization, dissociation and sublimation of our unconscious intentions is difficult and complex to decipher both in science and in art. But we can hardly consider correct the view, to which Freudians usually are inclined, that all the work of our consciousness essentially reduces itself to illusory self-pacification and self-deception: under unconscious intentions our consciousness places logical concepts, judgments or aesthetic images. It deceives us. With regard to the artist, Freudianism establishes this in a rather categorical manner, by asserting that his entire creative work is reduced to the painless overcoming in images of the primal Oedipus complex.[10] Meanwhile, our desires, interests and intentions are rooted not only in the realm of the faceless unconscious. A significant portion of them are realized immediately. Man is not an exclusively rational animal, but he does not belong among completely irrational animals either. Let us recall Marx's comment that the architect is distinguished from the bee by the fact that he has a preliminary plan of construction. A man sets himself goals, realizes his intentions and strives to satisfy them. Practice and experience convince us by the day and by

9. Oedipus complex—sexual feeling toward the mother and hostile feeling toward the father.

the hour that we are achieving, or we are failing to achieve, what we want and what we are consciously striving for. Between our unconscious and conscious intentions there does not exist the abyss which the Freudian school has tried to excavate. The worker may unconsciously strive to destroy the power of capital, but once he has joined with others and become conscious of himself as a class, he sets the same goals, but in an already conscious way. It is therefore not always and in all circumstances necessary to encipher his intentions. The work of consciousness is often reduced to deciphering our intentions, or at least those which, in the opinion of a person or class, deserve open and "legal" satisfaction. Enciphering or deciphering depends in the final analysis upon benefit and application. It is now beneficial for the proletariat to decipher even its most "vulgar" intentions; for the bourgeoisie, on the other hand, it is beneficial to encipher its most refined longings. Everything depends upon the time and place. The rationalization and sublimation of intentions takes place only under certain conditions, when, for a group of people or a class, it is necessary, beneficial and useful to conceal their intentions, or when the peculiarity of social relations leads to this need. There is no basis to reduce the entire labor of individual and social consciousness to self-deception.

Having made this significant qualification, we must once again stress that Marxism has always acknowledged the presence of individually and socially unconscious intentions which are carefully masked and kept in the dark.

> Just as in everyday life, the distinction is drawn between what a man thinks and says about himself, and that which he is and does in actual fact, so all the more so in historical struggles one must draw the distinction between the phrases and illusions of parties, and their actual nature, their actual interests, between their ideas about themselves and their real essence.[11]

In an epoch of revolutionary crises, people begin to urgently resurrect old heroes, old dates, slogans, costumes, and so forth. "Earlier revolutions had need of recalling world-historical events of the past in order to deceive themselves regarding their own content." In the forms of social consciousness, in political, legal, religious and aesthetic norms, in arguments and outlooks are expressed

10. The artist, of course, overcomes ideally what are real impulses, but they are not reduced to the Oedipus complex.

the interests of people, but they are unconsciously encoded and concealed. To a superficial glance, they are invisible. The very people who adhere to various views are profoundly convinced that their conceptions are free from real impulses and intentions. Therefore the task of the sociologist, historian, publicist or critic is reduced to "removing the veils," to deciphering ideas and opinions, and to translating them into the more realistic language of class interests, passions and motives. This method has thus far been feasibly used by Marxists in analyzing different aspects of social consciousness. Instructive examples of how Marxists uncover the real needs and behavior of man in art can be found in abundance by simply turning to Plekhanov. He, for instance, has established that what is useful appears attractive and beautiful to social man, but this usefulness is usually encoded. It seems to a man that his concepts of beauty contain inherent value and stand far removed from any utility. Many artists, who preach the theory of art for art's sake, think that they are protecting it from base utilitarianism, and they want to free art from elements which are alien and uncharacteristic. Plekhanov argued about this in another way: "The inclination of artists, who are vitally interested in artistic creativity, toward art for art's sake arises on the basis of their being hopelessly out of step with the social milieu which surrounds them" (Art and Social Life). It turns out that this inclination by no means reveals the "behavior" of the artist which exists in his imagination. Plekhanov further showed, in a superb manner, that the succession of schools and tendencies in art, which is inexplicable, groundless and mysterious at first glance, becomes understandable and well-grounded if one calls to attention that in the social struggle of classes people endeavor to act, think and feel "in just the opposite way" from the way their class antipode thinks and feels. The creators of the French comedy of tears of the eighteenth century, who advocated it as a replacement for classical tragedy, expressed, in essence, their rejection of its affectation and its depiction on the stage of emperors and kings. And this happened in its turn because in the hearts of the ideologues of the third estate "hatred was born with a simultaneous longing for justice." The comedy of tears was a distinctive "symbol" of the conduct of these ideologues. In order not to become lost in centuries past, let us recall that our counterrevolutionaries now furiously hate the color red not because it is somehow vile to them by its very nature, but only because Bolsheviks

11. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. (Cf. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 11 [New York: International Publishers, 1979], p. 128.

have made this color the symbol of their aspirations. Like the Sunday school teacher mentioned by Jameson, out of their hatred for Bolshevism they urgently select "arguments and quotations," at a different time and under different circumstances, perhaps, which have by no means even been shown to be convincing to themselves. It is true that in contrast to the teacher, since they are obscurantists, in choosing their material they display neither wide knowledge nor virtuosity. The real complex of their intentions, despite rationalization, is obvious here and easy to expose.

So Marxism has always been engaged in deciphering dynamic, unconscious social intentions, and Freudian psychoanalysis introduces nothing which is fundamentally new into the methodology of Marxism. But, in comparing Freudianism with the method of deciphering which is employed by Marxists, particularly in art, we must say that there are a number of considerations which by no means speak in favor of Freud's doctrine. We have already noted that in uncovering the behavior of man in the "symbols" of science and art, Marxism has never let out of sight the central question of the relationship of thought to being, while the Freudians who have been engaged in an analysis of works of art consider this question to be insignificant and inappropriate. Usually they limit themselves to ascertaining the subjective intentions of the author, reducing them to the highly debatable Oedipus complex. The concept of the unconscious has been so hyperbolized with them, that man, according to this outlook, is an irrational animal; the work of consciousness, especially with an artist, is reduced exclusively to the deception of both self and others. It is unclear how any practice is possible which will lead man to mastery over nature, and so forth. There is one no less important consideration upon which we should now dwell a bit more thoroughly.

In analyzing different aspects of social consciousness, including works of art, Marxists have invariably started from the proposition that they are not dealing with the separate, isolated individual, but with social man. Followers of Marx have always kept firmly in mind that political, judicial, religious and aesthetic views have developed under the determining influence of biological, climatic, geographic and social-historical conditions. But while the former conditions are relatively stable and invariant, social-historical conditions, in contrast, change incomparably more rapidly. In addition, the social milieu is much closer and more immediate for social man. Biological and climatic conditions therefore influence man through the medium of an artificial social milieu.

Starting from these propositions, Marx's followers assume that the main source of the changes and the evolution of morals, convictions and feelings must be sought in the social-historical milieu. As long as Freud's psychoanalysis is limited to an investigation of the psychology and even the psychopathology of individual people, examining them from the point of view of natural science, then he is, as they say, just the right man for the job. But Freudians, unfortunately, don't restrict themselves to this investigation; they try to analyze social intentions, feelings, views, ideas and images. From psychology they pass over to sociology, yet they remain on the foundation of studying man who is isolated from society. Acting in this way, the Freudians drag us backwards, in the best of cases, to the so-called abstract scientific point of view, which is salutary in biology, physiology and psychology, but justly condemned in sociology as far back as with Marx. This is the usual mistake made by scientists when they pass from the field of science into the field of social science. Usually the application of the abstract scientific method to phenomena from the social order leads to meager, abstract and empty general propositions. The very same results occur with the Freudians when they broaden the boundaries of their investigations and submit to analysis such forms of social consciousness as art. Comrade Grigoriev clearly demonstrated in his article that the work of Freudians in the realm of art yields the "most negative and monotonous results." But he supposes that such results are achieved only because the Freudians use sexual theory too one-sidedly while interpreting works of art. This is so. But if, besides sexual stimuli, the Freudians acknowledged others—hunger, social instincts, and so forth—the situation would not be sharply different. The results obtained here would still prove to be monotonous, for instead of psychoanalyzing social man, they take the isolated psychical individual. One can never find out from their works what is the social milieu, what are the morals, what is everyday life, what are the social views, and in what way did they influence the writer and his work. It is as if the social milieu simply didn't exist at all. Compare Plekhanov's monograph on Ibsen with Freud's psychoanalysis as applied to Ibsen's play Rosmersholm. Unlike his Russian cothinkers, Freud masterfully utilizes the method of psychoanalysis. Let us agree with him that Rebecca is destroyed, when all is said and done, due to incest, i.e., cohabitation with her father. However, the basic artistic idea of the famous playwright lies not here; it is contained in the tragic collision between the stern world outlook of Rosmersholm, who subjugated Rebecca to himself, and the immediate, disor-

ganized, active but amoral force of life. This is the central idea of H. Ibsen's best works—the tree of life, the tree of the cross, the abyss between them—and thirdly, the troubled kingdom in the future where Ibsen imagines the organic intertwining of the tree of life with the tree of the cross, the intermingling of the force of immediate life with the demands of duty. G. V. Plekhanov did not make an exhaustive analysis of Ibsen's works, and there are significant gaps in his monograph, but his analysis very convincingly answers the question of why Ibsen was unable to resolve the collisions between Brand's duty and Per Gynt's amorphous lust for life. Plekhanov showed in his article that Ibsen's morality is abstract and devoid of concrete content. Due to this circumstance, Ibsen found his way into a number of hopeless blind alleys. "Brand does not understand that eternal movement ("the non-created spirit") appears only during the creation of the temporary, i.e., the new: new things, new situations and relations between things." Ibsen didn't understand this either. Why did this happen with Ibsen? Plekhanov answered with the results of his analysis: "Here the milieu which surrounds Ibsen is to blame. This milieu [Norway, where Ibsen was born and grew up—A.V.] was well enough defined to evoke a negative response within Ibsen, but it was not sufficiently defined, because it was too undeveloped to evoke within him a definite yearning for something 'new'.... Therefore he wandered about in the wasteland of inescapable and fruitless negation" (G. V. Plekhanov, Henrik Ibsen). Plekhanov's "psychoanalysis" leads us into sociology. Plekhanov looks upon Ibsen as a social man, therefore the results of his analysis are by no means monotonous, and they provide answers to the main questions which interested Ibsen as an artist. Freud's psychoanalysis completely passes by these questions, dealing with the basic content of neither Rosmersholm nor Ibsen's work. Incest in the drama is only a detail, albeit a very substantial one. Rebecca's tragedy begins not from this moment, but from the time she has felt that the stern outlook of Rosmersholm has deprived her of her audacious will.

Without understanding that man is a social animal, that our behavior and thoughts are incomprehensible until one has studied the social milieu which has nurtured them, the Freudians are even further away from applying the class point of view in literary criticism. This is understandable. The point of view which looks upon the individual, isolated from the social environment, ineluctably leads to an abandonment of class analysis. Since the division of society into classes, social life has proceeded in forms of class struggle; whoever abandons

the social point of view must also, of course, renounce the class point of view. I. Grigoriev feels that Freudianism may be of some benefit to Marxists in analyzing the technique which assists in the formation of ideological values arising as a superstructure over the economic base. In his opinion, psychoanalysis may show in what way one must uncover the real complexes of hidden interests in religious, moral and aesthetic norms. This assertion is fundamentally wrong. It is possible that Freud has done very much for explaining the technique of intellectual life of individual man, but in order to understand the technique with whose assistance real social interests are reflected in social, ideological values, one must know the dynamics of the class struggle. Without this knowledge it is impossible to make a single step. But we already know that the dynamics of the class struggle are organically alien to Freudianism, and that there has not been a single case when the Freudians, or at least their most authoritative representatives, have adopted the class point of view while interpreting the phenomena of social life. Whoever thinks that matters are not that bad, that one must simply unite Freudianism with Marxism, is sadly mistaken. The sociological approach is organically foreign to Freudians; they are subjectivists. Their method in aesthetics is therefore devoid of any historicity. They are forced to mark time. They simply cannot yield anything but monotonous results.

We must deal with one more question. Freudians say that the artist unconsciously cloaks and carefully enciphers in the images of his imagination both his actual intentions and his behavior (Oedipus complex). Thanks to such "ideal" experience, he is freed from the power of unconscious impulses. This time we won't argue. But here is a question: Does the artist conceal the intentions of his heroes in his works? We know that, in creating various types, the artist often uses them to make up, so to speak, various sides of his own "ego." Nevertheless, we cannot place an equals sign between the author and the heroes he describes. Sobakevich, Chichikov, Khlestakov, Onegin, Pechorin and Platon Karataev each live their own separate lives in various works, apart from the writer. In order to depict them, the author must step away, and objectify them, even those that are closest and most familiar to him. Thus one of the basic methods employed up until now by the great masters in art has been the exposure of the true intentions, feelings and thoughts of the heroes they are portraying. To be brief, the artist not only conceals but uncovers. He depicts his characters not in the way that they think about themselves, and not in the way that they would seem to us if they lived among us, but the way

that they are in reality. Innermost thoughts and feelings, secret passions and desires, undisclosed crimes, everything that is usually kept carefully hidden from public opinion and from the outsider's eye, that which the hero himself doesn't even know—all this the artist makes the subject of his portrayal, and with the power of his creative gift he penetrates into all these hidden corners and nooks of human experience. Take the two leading figures of Russian literature—Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, who are quite the opposite to each other in many ways. With enormous power, both writers exposed their heroes; and through them, they often exposed themselves. Tolstoy "removed the veils" from all that is apparent, false, deceitful, unnatural and distorted by contemporary civilization. Dostoevsky lowered us into the underground of human feelings and thoughts, torturing and tormenting both himself and the reader. We would like to say that if, in the opinion of the Freudians, we must apply psychoanalysis to Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, then, on the other hand, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky themselves used psychoanalysis. In art, a particular kind of psychoanalysis has been used long before Freud. Artists have unmasked themselves and their heroes. But their evidence by no means coincides with Freud's doctrine. Despite their colossal power of intuition, neither Tolstoy nor Dostoevsky found that, in the human psyche, essentially psychopathological, sexual feelings reign (the Oedipus complex), or that unconscious intentions, which are antisocial in content, cover the whole field of our consciousness and guide our actions. And more than anyone else, they knew the significance of the dynamic unconscious in man's life. Moreover, in portraying their heroes they yielded far from monotonous results. In revealing the intentions of people they instinctively saw them as dependent on the social environment surrounding them. In this respect, the realist Tolstoy is more instructive. In his works he truly was a spontaneous dialectical materialist. But even the more subjective Dostoevsky, who seems to be the most alluring for the Freudians, knew that personality is inseparable from milieu. A social element was by no means foreign to his psychoanalysis. In addition, these great masters of the written word avoided monotonous results because they were not sparing in their depiction of the reality which nourished their works with its mighty wealth and variety.

Conclusions

A mark of subjectivism and idealism lies on Freud's entire doctrine. Freud recognizes only the dependence of our consciousness on the faceless unconscious, thereby providing a negative response to the question of the causal connection between consciousness and the external world. Hence the theory of dream-symbols. The facts of consciousness are merely symbols and hieroglyphs, behind which hide subjective, unconscious intentions. The task of aesthetics is reduced to explaining these "dreams" in works of art. The question of the reflection of reality by the artist is discarded. Intentions are explained in a subjective sense, torn from the external environment. Such a methodological arrangement is foreign to Marxist aesthetics, for both in science and in art Marxism starts from the proposition that thinking is determined by being and that our perceptions are not merely the hieroglyphs of subjective intentions, but the images of reality existing independently of us.

The doctrine of the dynamic unconscious, which is evidently valuable and rewarding for psychiatrists, nevertheless has a one-sided character. It exaggerates the unconscious element in the individual and denies the active nature of conscious impulses. Freudians reduce the unconscious to exclusively sexual motives, leaving no place for other, less powerful incentives. For them, sexual impulses embrace atavistic and pathological inclinations: narcissism, the Oedipus complex, homosexuality, lesbian love, and so forth. The psychic architectonics of personality, including the personality of the artist, consequently bears a psychopathological nature and must, strictly speaking, serve as an object of analysis only for the psychiatrist and psychopathologist. To a large extent, the positive features in Freud's doctrine of the dynamic unconscious (the intuitive creative process, the irrationality of deeds and actions under the influence of the elemental unconscious, the rationalization of hidden impulses and their displacement) had previously been taken into account by Marxism and in particular by Marxist art criticism, but Marxism never succumbed to the inordinate exaggerations of the Freudians.

In full agreement with their subjective idealist system of views, the Freudians remain, during the psychoanalysis of works of art, entrenched in the study of the individual who is isolated from all society. Just as they view the data of our perceptions not in their connection with the external environment, but only with the elemental unconscious, so, too, the artist, his heroes, and characters are analyzed by the Freudian school in isolation from the social-historical milieu. The Freudians would have grounds for doing this if they

limited themselves to the field of psycho-biological investigations. Meanwhile they ever more frequently are beginning to apply their method to social phenomena, the mechanics and dynamics of which can only be understood by means of analyzing social man, by means of social, and not individual, analysis. In practice, Freud's psychoanalysis in literary criticism resembles the act of running in place. It lacks any historicity. Russian Freudians, who know neither measure nor limitation, are additionally threatened by the immediate danger of becoming bogged down in discoveries that such and such an artist had incestuous longings, another desired patricide, a third wanted to rape his mother, and so forth. Here absurdities and exaggerations can easily degenerate into a provocative vulgarity.

Soviet society is unquestionably devoting a great deal of attention to Freudianism at this time. How is such interest to be explained? A few aspects of Freudianism, from a superficial and outward point of view, seem to resemble Marxism. Such, for instance, is the doctrine of hidden, unconscious intentions, their rationalization and sublimation. Taken by themselves, in isolation, these sides of psychoanalysis superficially seem to have a Marxist appearance. Only when they are taken in conjunction with Freud's entire system of views do they reveal their kinship not with Marxism, but with "the grand, metaphysical systems." The presence of medical terms, an outward appearance which is too positive—all this leans toward the temptation of uniting Freudianism with Marxism. It is particularly easy to give in to this temptation for the Marxizing and Marxist-type nonparty circles of the intelligentsia who are attracted to Marxism but still remain a certain distance from it. We must also remember that our epoch of strained class conflicts is very subjective. Practice powerfully explodes into theory.

But there are, in all probability, other reasons as well. In connection with the stabilization of capitalism, with NEP and with the restrained tempo of the revolutionary struggle in the West, we have witnessed a significant growth in the taste for and interest in personal problems, among which the problem of sex occupies a highly respected place. In some places one can note a certain disillusionment with the rational direction and course of the social struggle of the proletariat. We know that, unconsciously up until now, and at times consciously, the NEP had been explained as the direct surrender of positions to dubious forces of social chaos. Notes of disenchantment and disillusionment arise even in some unstable circles of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth.

With its apology for and hyperbolization of unconscious and sexual forces, Freudianism can appeal to and provoke great interest among those who have been shaken up and who have fallen into a semi-unbalanced state with regard to the "hum-drum life of the revolution." Of course, these presuppositions are only rough notes which we feel to be true, but which demand special and more careful investigation. For the time being we would like to say that, as a system of views, Freudianism is incompatible with Marxist literary criticism.

PS. Issue no. 12 for 1925 of the Herald of the Communist Academy contains the stenogram of a substantial report given by V. M. Friche on the topic which interests us: "Freudianism and Art." The reporter limited himself primarily to an examination of Freud's sexual theory. The conclusions were formulated by Comrade Friche in the following theses:

1. By deriving the artistic act ultimately from sexual feelings, and at times even identifying them, the Vienna school contradicts what we know about the origin of art and about art in the early stages of civilization.

2. By considering the artistic act to be the sublimation of the incestuous complex, it erotically prepares certain literary images, just as the Vienna poets erotically prepare their heroes.

3. The extraordinary attraction of the Vienna school to the sexual moment is stated with particular clarity in their explanation of the psychology and image of those who struggle against the monarch.

4. By sexualizing other concepts and symbols with which artists operate, they contradict one another in the most striking manner.

5. In their explanation, art is robbed of any socially organizing character, and its social significance is reduced merely to rendering harmless certain culturally unnecessary affects.

6. While allowing at lower levels of culture the dependence of the artist's work on external causes, the Vienna school considers the artist at higher stages of culture to be free from any social, cultural and literary influences.

7. By viewing artists outside their historical milieu, it misinterprets their works and is completely incapable of explaining the peculiarities of their thematics and form.

8. By seeing in the history of art only the succession of great creators, the Vienna school thereby denies the idea of the science of art as a lawful

process of development.

9. By studying not the history of art, but the psychology of the artist, it has not uncovered the latest secret of the artist—his capability of sublimation....

10. On the entire doctrine of the Vienna school about art, insofar as we have elaborated it, there lies the mark—clear, albeit interesting—of dilettantism.

Comrade Friche's considerations seem to us to be correct, as well as his conclusion about the incompatibility of Marxism and Freudianism.

Lebedev-Poliansky, Kharazov, Stolpner and Pereverzev took part in the discussion of the lecture. While referring interested readers to the stenogram, we will very briefly note the chief results. While agreeing with the conclusions of V. M. Friche, Comrade Lebedev-Poliansky proposes that separate biological aspects of Freudianism contain much that is healthy and interesting. Here one must consider the proposition, for instance, that the subconscious plays a colossal role in creativity. Freudianism can by no means replace Marxism, but it can prove to be useful in analyzing individual peculiarities of the artist. Kharazov feels that Freud is a masterful psychiatrist who can contribute much to art criticism. The thought that everything is derived from sexuality is correct. "Here there is nothing that is strange or terrible." Stolpner believes that Freud is a man of brilliant intuition, but that his doctrine contains much that is far-fetched (incest, the Oedipus complex, and so forth). In its own field, Freudianism is a finished and real hypothesis. But "Freudianism is spreading to the area of primitive culture ... it is being transferred to the area of literary studies.... In the field of literary studies, Freudianism contributes nothing. It's a void." Pereverzev states: "To consider Freudianism a materialist system related to Marxism is a most profound illusion. Freudianism and psychoanalysis are thoroughly idealist systems.... In his psychoanalysis, Freud starts from the subject, from an analysis of subjective experiences.... Marxism can borrow nothing from Freudianism in its investigations into literary criticism." The idea of the subconscious has long since been known to Marxists, but the concept of the subconscious with Marxists is different from that of Freud. "It's not what belongs specifically to the individual, but what comes somewhere from

the biological depths, from the mass elemental realm—it is the genus, it is the collective which lives in the individual psyche." According to Freud, "art lies completely in the field of neuropathology, the Marxist sociologist has nothing to do here."

Clearly, Freud's psychoanalysis didn't fare too well at the Communist Academy. And rightfully so.